Introduction
Researchers have been documenting the decline of grassroots political parties across the advanced democracies for nearly three decades (Katz et al. 1992; Mair, 1994; Scarrow, 2000; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Dalton, 2005; Heidar, 2006; Van Biezen, et al., 2012) . This trend, variously attributed both to supply and demand side factors (van Haute and Gauja, 2015: 4-6) , is important because political parties, even if they are seen by many as little better than 'necessary evils' (see Ignazi, 2017) , continue to play a central role in the effectiveness of democracy. Notwithstanding the greater participatory rights of party members (Faucher, 2014; Scarrow, 2015; Webb et al. 2017; Fisher et al., 2014) , a decline in their numbers has important implications for the future of democracy (Scarrow, 1996; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Webb et al., 2002; Gauja, 2015) .
In Britain, however, things have changed. Whether temporary or permanent, all of the major political parties, with the exception of the Conservatives, have seen a recent reversal of 
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The study of factors that lead people to join parties is certainly not new (see van Haute and Gauja, 2015: 8) . In this paper, however, we try specifically to explain the nature of the resurgence in Labour party membership. As of January 2018, Labour had 552,000 members, a massive increase on the 198,000 recorded prior to the 2015 election (see Audickas, et al., 2018) .
Such a reversal of Labour's membership decline has happened before, even if it eventually turned out to be short-lived -most obviously following Tony Blair's successful leadership bid in 1994 (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002) . The Blair blip, however, did not approach anything like that seen since 2015. But while media coverage can give the impression that those who joined are one homogenous, predominantly youthful mass, not all of them share the same profile, as we show below. Most obviously, some have joined the party for the first time, while others have returned to it after a prolonged absence.
This study comprises two parts. In the first, we use British Election Study (BES) 1 data to look at the factors driving the surge in these two types of membership. We test six related hypotheses examining differences between long-established and returning members on the one hand, and new joiners on the other. We then develop two additional hypotheses, using Party Members Project (PMP) 2 data, on the determinants of support for Jeremy Corbyn who, the findings generated by BES data suggest, played a crucial role in driving the rapid growth of membership after he became a leadership candidate.
The BES data allows us to compare different types of party member, while the PMP data permits us to probe the views of party members more closely, particularly in relation to their attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn and the timing of their decision to join or re-join the party.
We begin by reviewing the literature on why people join (or re-join) political parties before focusing on Labour's recent revival.
Why Do People Join Political Parties?
There are a number of models of political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Parry, et al., 1992) , several of which have been applied to the task of explaining why people join parties (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002; Scarrow 2015; Gauja, 2015) .
Some of these models relate to long-term social processes and rely on variables such as social class, education and community cohesion which change slowly over time -for instance, the Civic Voluntarism (Verba et al., 1995) and Social Capital models (Putnam 2000) . The former stresses the importance of individual resources and the latter community resources as drivers of participation. Clearly, the rise in Labour's membership after the 2015 general election cannot be fully explained by these relatively slow moving social processes, as membership more than doubled within just a few months.
That said, two theoretical models would seem to be particularly relevant for understanding the surge in Labour's membership. One, the General Incentives Model (GIM), was developed at the time of the first surveys of party members in Britain (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992) . This model is based on the idea that actors respond to a variety of incentives when they participate in politics. It combines variables associated with rational choice theories, which focus on the costs and benefits of participation, with social-psychological measures, such social norms and ideological beliefs which help to motivate individuals to get involved. Unfortunately, the model includes many variables which are not available in BES surveys. In addition, some of the variables in the model, such as perceptions of benefits and costs, are unlikely to change in a matter of months. For these reasons we do not directly test the theory in the present paper, although it has been discussed in other research (Poletti et al., 2018 ).
The second model of interest here is based on relative deprivation theory originally introduced by Stouffer et al. (1949) and subsequently developed by Runciman (1966) . This theory is based on the idea that individuals develop expectations as to how economic, political and social systems should treat them in relation to issues of equity and fairness. At the same time they also develop judgements about how they are actually treated in practice.
The greater the gap between expectations and evaluations, and the more negative the comparisons, the more likely they are to experience frustration and anger (Walker and Smith, 2002) . This theory can be tested using BES data.
These emotional responses are a 'potent, volatile, instigator of action' (Marcus et al., 2000: 26) and a stimulus to obtaining and processing information in order to try to explain and, if possible, change these negative comparisons (Conover and Feldman, 1986; Marcus, 1988) : 'If the evaluation proves to be negative, the individual experiences relative deprivation and is motivated to one of several possible behaviours, ranging from changing membership in the negatively evaluated group to changing the dimensions of comparison ' (Walker and Pettigrew 1984: 302) .
The context in which comparisons are made is a key factor in understanding how relative deprivation works to stimulate political action (Runciman, 1966, p.9) since it depends on people's attributions of responsibility. Blaming negative comparisons on oneself can lead to withdrawal and apathy, whereas attributing them to the organisation of society and the political system can stimulate participation. Such attributions motivate people to participate in political parties, social movements, and politics more generally (Walker and Smith, 2002;  see also Sniderman et al., 1991) . Blaming the political system is likely to have become particularly salient after the Great Recession, and recent research suggests that relative deprivation played an important role in explaining the rise in party membership and electoral support for UKIP after the 2010 general election (Clarke et al., 2017) .
Accordingly, we examine the surge in Labour party membership, particularly after Jeremy Corbyn became the party leader, with the assistance of relative deprivation theory.
The central argument is that relative deprivation drove Labour's membership revival but that its effects were conditional on two additional inter-related variables, namely ideology and attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn himself. The shift to the left associated with his leadership and the promise of a new style of politics ensured that feelings of relative deprivation mobilised new members to join the party who otherwise might have remained apathetic and uninvolved. We now move on to a close examination of the changes in Labour party membership after the 2015 general election and how these related to relative deprivation and other measures.
Labour's membership surge
We start with the 'Relative Deprivation' hypothesis: Clarke et al., 2017: 101-102 Was there, though, any difference between those who returned to the Labour Party and those who joined the party for the first time? Our fifth hypothesis addresses this question.
During Tony Blair's 'Third Way' years the party arguably swung significantly to the right (Shaw, 1996; Driver and Martell, 1998; Gould, 1998; Seyd and Whiteley, 2002 
BES data and membership type
We can test these six hypotheses about the types of party member -those with Table 2 Table 3 shows that the graduate new recruits and returning members are rather similar to each other with around 37 percent of the former and 31 percent of the latter on below average incomes as opposed to less than a quarter of existing members.
These findings are largely consistent with H3, and indicate that the objective conditions for creating a sense of relative deprivation were more apparent among Labour's new graduate recruits and its returning members than among the existing graduate members. Table 3 also shows that the pattern seen in the first hypothesis extends to the subjective measure of relative deprivation, fear of poverty. Only about a fifth of the existing graduate and returning graduate members thought that they would have difficulty making ends meet in the future, compared with a third of the first-time graduate joiners. This finding is also consistent with H2. The results in Table 4 show that the returning members were most enthusiastic about Corbyn, followed by the first-time joiners, who in turn were more supportive of him than the existing members, all of which supports H4. Table 5 . It confirms H6 since the first-time joiners were much more likely to agree with that statement than were existing or returning members. Altogether, just over 40 percent of existing members agreed with the proposition, as did 60 percent of returning members and no less than 80 percent of the first-time joiners. The latter, in other words, had a much more jaundiced view of 'politics as usual' than the other party members.
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Having examined each hypothesis separately, we now bring them together in Table 7 by estimating a multinomial logistic model of membership which compares the first-time joiners and the returning members with existing members as the reference category. The model contains the predictors associated with the six hypotheses examined earlier, together with controls for social background characteristics. It is clear that four variables are statistically significant predictors of the two types of new member who joined after the 2015 election (returning members and first-time joiners) compared to existing members -namely, perceptions that politicians do not care, attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn, the left-right ideology scale, and age.
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The evidence on political cynicism confirms that discontent with 'politics as usual'
was, indeed, one of the key drivers of recruitment to the Labour party during this period.
First-time joiners, and also returning members, were both more cynical about conventional politics and liked Jeremy Corbyn more than the existing members. In contrast, the returning members were ideologically to the left of existing members and first-time joiners. Not surprisingly, returning members were older than existing members and first-time joiners were younger. The first-time joiners differed from the existing members and returning members in that they were less likely to be graduates, but more likely to be low-income graduates and also more likely to be female than the other types of members. Table 7 , and so have no direct influence on membership in the model. Yet they do have a powerful indirect influence on membership, as shown in Table 8 . The latter presents the results of an ordered logit regression model of the political cynicism variable, which is a powerful predictor in Table 7 . To avoid problems of endogeneity in the estimates, graduates who shared this fear were less likely to be cynical. But it is particularly noteworthy that anti-capitalist values were strong predictors of political cynicism -so much so that they eclipsed ideology in the model.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 7 and 8 shown that support for Jeremy Corbyn has been crucial in the decision to join Labour in the previous analysis. Table 9 shows that, consistent with our previous hypotheses, being leftwing and having anti-capitalist values were important factors in explaining support for Jeremy Corbyn, although the latter is only just above the level of statistical significance. In line with earlier results, we can also see that those who supported Jeremy Corbyn tended to have lower incomes. Thus, it seems that it is the 'objective' conditions creating a sense of relative deprivation that are more important in influencing positive feelings towards Jeremy
Corbyn than any subjective fear of poverty. Finally, as we have already seen for first-time joiners in the previous model, Corbyn supporters are more likely to be female than male. (Campbell and Stanley, 2015) . Thus, we can test the following additional hypothesis:
H7: Those who joined the party from June 2015 onwards were more likely to express their support for Jeremy Corbyn than those who joined in May 2015.
A final possibility is that a left-wing candidate like Jeremy Corbyn who argues for greater action against inequality and material insecurity might be successful in attracting support from members from less well-heeled backgrounds. If this is correct, we would expect that those who opted to join Labour after June 2015 to have been motivated by economic concerns relating to short-term contracts, job insecurity, lower pay, and so on. Accordingly, we expect that:
The lower a new member's income, the more likely they were to express their support for Jeremy Corbyn.
Results: Explaining support for Jeremy Corbyn
Using the PMP data, we explain support for Jeremy Corbyn by looking at the relationship between the predictors specified in H7 and H8 (timing of membership and income) and three different indicators of leadership support, namely a) how important belief in the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn was for members' decisions to join the party, b) how likely they were to vote for Jeremy Corbyn if another Labour MP challenged him for the leadership, and c) how likely they thought it was that Labour would win the next general election if Corbyn were to remain leader.
With some differences among the three measures of support, the pattern which emerges in Table 10 is that the strongest supporters of Jeremy Corbyn tended to have joined after he decided to run in the 2015 leadership election and have household incomes below average. Thus, the findings lend support to both Hypotheses 7 and 8. Table 11 we specify and test these two variables with PMP data, together with additional indicators arising from H7 and H8
(that is, left-right ideology, anti-capitalist values, time of joining the party, household income, plus controls for demographic factors and type of membership).
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The results confirm the patterns that emerged in Table 10 . Those who joined after June 2015
were more likely to support Corbyn and generally had lower incomes than other members, confirming H7 and H8 in the multivariate model. Not surprisingly, given our previous findings, we can also see that Corbyn supporters were more likely to be left-wing, anticapitalist, and older -and less likely to be graduates and male -than other members. We can also see that there is no significant difference between first-time joiners and returning members in their support for Jeremy Corbyn.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have investigated a number of related hypotheses pertaining to the surge in Labour Party membership after May 2015, focussing on two key dependent variables: the type of member (existing, returning or first-time joiner) and support for Jeremy Corbyn as a motivation for joining.
Relative deprivation was plainly a significant factor that drove people, and particularly first-time joiners, to join Labour once a candidate with a clear radical profile was on the leadership ballot: those who might be labelled 'left behind' flocked to Jeremy Corbyn's colours, including graduates earning less than the average income. Anti-capitalist values also appeared to be a feature of the new members, as was disenchantment with politics-as-usual and a yearning for a new style of politics. But incentives like ideology mattered too. Post-2015 recruits who had previously belonged to the Labour Party and who re-joined it were more left-wing. Demographic factors played only a limited part in understanding Labour's membership surge, although it looks as if those in lower social grades seemed to be more likely than others to be attracted to the party. First-time joiners
were not, on the whole, university graduates or high income middle-class radicals; rather, they looked a little more like the party's 'traditional' grassroots, being less educated and in lower status occupations than the existing members. And, although first-time joiners were younger than returning members, the average post-2015 recruit is still middle-aged. There were also more women among the new recruits, which is interesting and requires further investigation. How all these developments affect the party's policy platform -theoretically responsive to its grassroots -is well worth watching.
We do not examine the role of mobilising organisations such as Momentum in this analysis, although it is likely to be an important part of the story about how the surge in membership was sustained after Corbyn's first victory in September 2015. Neither can this research tell us whether the remarkable surge in Labour's membership after 2015 will turn out to be a one-time, contingent, never-to-be repeated event, but it affords an important insight into its nature and wider debates. One such debate, within the framework of the General Incentives Model (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992) a =p<0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Joined because of belief in leadership = 'How important was belief in the party's leadership for your decision to join the party?' (0=not important at all, 10=extremely important); figures indicate percentages of members who gave a score included between 7 and 10. Would vote for Corbyn = percentage indicating that they would certainly vote for Jeremy Corbyn if another Labour MP or MPs challenged him for the leadership between now and the next election (other answers: vote for whatever candidate challenged Jeremy Corbyn; I would make up my mind depending on who is the challenger). Labour to win GE = percentage answering very or fairly likely to the question 'If Jeremy Corbyn remains leader of the Labour party, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that Labour will win the next general election?'. Time of joining = percentages of Labour members who joined in May 2015, when Jeremy Corbyn was not a candidate in the leadership election, and who joined in/after June 2015, when Jeremy Corbyn was a candidate. 6 Although this measure has some limitations, it is worth noting that some 31 percent of respondents who thought that the national economy was doing much better than they were also thought that they were very likely to face poverty in the future. In contrast only 16 percent of people who perceive this gap are not concerned about poverty. This comparison captures the difference between the individual and society central to relative deprivation theory and suggests that those fearing poverty are quite likely to think of themselves as worse off than the rest of the country. 7 This impression is reinforced by the qualitative, 'write-in' responses of many of those surveyed by the PMP in May 2015 who had previously left and re-joined Labour even before the post-election leadership contest got underway: their visceral dislike of Blair, both for shifting the party away from socialism and for participating in the US-led invasion of Iraq, leaps off the page. 8 PMP research was made possible by the support of the Economic and Social Research Council's grant ES/M007537/1, which we gratefully acknowledge. 9 YouGov recruited the survey respondents from a panel of 300,000 volunteers. Upon joining the panel volunteers complete a survey asking a broad range of demographic questions which are subsequently used to recruit respondents matching desired demographic quotas for surveys. Potential respondents for the party member surveys were identified from questions asking individuals if they were members of any of a list of large membership organisations, including the parties. Results are not weighted in any way since there are no known official population parameters for the various party memberships. However, YouGov's Labour Party membership survey in 2016 using unweighted data generated a prediction for the party leadership contests accurate to within 1% of the final official outcome, which gives us confidence in the quality of the data (https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/09/24/labour-membersexit-poll-corbyn-wins-all-except-yo/).
